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JUSTICE HARLAN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
I. INTRODUCTION

When Justice John Marshall Harlan left the United States Supreme
Court in 1971, our federal system lost one of its great champions.
Throughout his sixteen years on the Court,' Justice Harlan consistently
strove to preserve the "delicate balance of federal-state relations." 2
According to one respected scholar, federalism was "the central theme of
his judicial universe";3 another commentator went
4 so far as to call
Harlan's commitment to federalism an "obsession."
Although federalism lost one faithful advocate on the Court that year,
it soon gained another. In 1972, Justice Harlan's seat on the bench was
filled by William Hubbs Rehnquist. 5 Like his predecessor, Justice
Rehnquist places the principles of federalism at the top of his hierarchy of
constitutional values. 6
Yet, although both of these men are widely reputed as defenders of
federalism, there are significant differences in their definition and use of
this concept. This note examines what each has meant by the word
federalism, and the reasons it compelled his commitment. In addition, this
note presents each Justice's treatment of the nature and extent of
constitutional limitations on state policymaking, and the desirability of
Court-based reform and judicial restraint.

1. Justice Harlan was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1955 by President
Eisenhower. He retired in 1971, due to failing health, and died shortly thereafter. ELDER
WRITr, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 870 (2d ed.
1990).
2. John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in
Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 944 (1963).
3. Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2803, 2819 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
4. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Justice John M. Harlanand the Values of Federalism, 57
VA. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1971).
5. Justice Rehnquist was appointed to the bench by President Nixon. In 1986 he was
elevated to Chief Justice, under the nomination of President Reagan. WMrr, supra note 1,
at 877.
6. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1989).
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II. JUSTICE HARLAN'S FEDERALISM: BALANCE AND RESTRAINT

A. In a Word: Balance
Federalism served as a guiding beacon in Justice Harlan's
constitutional decision making. 7 His opinions are replete with references
to federal-state relations,' and he frequently wrote and spoke on the
subject.9 In Chapman v. California," he said: [A]mong the
constitutional values which contribute to the preservation of our free
society none ranks higher than the principles of federalism . . . ." To
Justice Harlan, the essence of federalism was a state of balanced and
harmonious relations between the states and the federal government. And
he believed that it was his duty, as a Supreme Court Justice, to maintain
that balance. As he said in Dombrowski v. Pftster.1

"[I]t is a prime

responsibility of this Court to maintain federal-state court relationships in
good working order." 13
The great virtue of our federal system, according to Harlan, was its

provision for both national unity and decentralized power." He believed
7. Commentators who have considered the subject are in agreement on this point. See,
e.g., Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial
Decision Making, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 251,252 (stating that Harlan "placed this principle
at the peak of his hierarchy of constitutional values"); Dorsen, supra note 3, at 2819
(asserting that federalism was "the central theme of his judicial universe"); Wilkinson,
supra note 4, at 1186 (stating that federalism was "the transcendent theme of Harlan's legal
career, the cornerstone of his judicial perspective").
8. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority's decision to uphold §4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could
only be sustained at the sacrifice of the boundaries between federal and state political
authority); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the majority's one-man, one-vote requirement will result in a radical alteration in the
relationship between state and federal governments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 683
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court lacks the power to impose rules of
criminal procedure on local courts).
9. See, e.g., John M. Harlan, DedicatoryAddress, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 920 (1963);
Harlan, supra note 2; John M. Harlan & Potter Stewart, Robert H. Jackson's Influence on
Federal State Relationships, 23 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7 (1968).
10. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
11. Id. at 57 (Harlan, 3., dissenting).
12. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. See Harlan, supra note 9, at 922 (referring to "the peculiar genius of our federal
system under which we have achieved national solidarity and unparalleled strength and at
the same time kept governmental authority workably diffused between the federal
establishment and the states"); see also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 465 (1965)
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that our structure of government, more than any of the specific guarantees
in the Constitution, is what accounts for our free society.15 "[I]n a
diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this
Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. "' 6 Our founders, he said,
believed that "the security of liberty in America rested primarily upon the
dispersion of governmental power across a federal system.""
It was this view that so often led Harlan to dissent as his peers on the
Court gave broad meaning to the Bill of Rights. While the majority of the
Court-and indeed the majority of the country-may have seen the
Warren Court revolution as a great boon for personal liberty, Harlan
perceived it as, at least in the long run, quite the opposite. In his view, the
Court was transferring a substantial degree of local legislative power to
itself which, although at the time used to expand personal rights and
freedoms, could end up limiting the scope of protected individual
liberty."8 To Harlan, the federal judiciary was not the government's
"least dangerous branch," 19 but was perhaps its most dangerous. Active
state legislatures, not an activist Court, were the proper defenders of
liberty in America.
In Harlan's view, the primary role of the Supreme Court was to
maintain the dispersion of power across the federal system-to ensure that
the federal government did not intrude into areas of state control, and that
the states did not overstep their roles by interfering in areas delegated to
the federal government. This is "the 'delicate balance' between state and
federal authority"' that he so consistently endeavored to preserve.
B. Harlan's Thorough Justifications .
Not only did Justice Harlan clearly expound what he sought to
preserve under the rubric of federalism, he also explained why such efforts
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the federal system is a "priceless aspect of our
constitutionalism").
15. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 & n.3 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(citing THE FEDERAlIST No. 51 (James Madison) as the "locus classicus" for this view).
18. Justice Harlan believed that the wholesale application of national constitutional
standards to the states could result in the dilution of federal rights, since the standards may
have to be lowered to avoid unduly burdening the states. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Harlan,supra note 2 (discussing the
dangers of Supreme Court activism).
19. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH (1962).
20. Harlan & Stewart, supra note 9, at 8.
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were necessary; in typical Harlan fashion, he clearly articulated the
reasons in support of his beliefs. 2 '

First, Harlan believed that respect for our federal system was essential
to maintain an effective popular democracy. He felt that power was

distributed between the states and the federal government with the specific
aim of, and in a manner most conducive to, the ideal of selfgovernance.' Any shift in power-any overstepping of boundarieswould affect the political process. Too much of a shift, and the notion of
popular self-governance upon which our country was founded would
become but a memory.'

Harlan expressed this view in his dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders.'
After criticizing the majority's holding as one that "saps the political
process," he said: "The promise of judicial intervention in matters
[committed to the political branches] cannot but encourage popular inertia
. . .with the inevitable result that the process itself is weakened."' He

reiterated this view in his dissent in Reynolds v. Sims:l "I believe that
the vitality of our political system, on which in the last analysis all else
depends, is weakened by reliance on the judiciary for political reform; in
time a complacent body politic may result."' In other words, if the
Court oversteps its role and intervenes in the political process, people will

come to rely primarily upon the Court to protect their rights' and, over
time, will cease to take an active role in their own governance.2

21. For a discussion of the principled and explicatory nature of Harlan's decision
making, see Bourguignon, supra note 7, at 288-95; Alexander D. Flesher, Justice Harlan
and the Art of Judicial Persuasion (Apr. 16, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the New York Law School Law Review).
22. See Harlan, supra note 2.
23. See id.
24. 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 48.
26. 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 624.
28. Unlike most Justices of the Warren era, Harlan saw our federal system-not the
Court or the Bill of Rights-as the primary bulwark of personal liberties in this country.
See Harlan, supra note 2, at 943-44 (stating that although we are "accustomed to speak of
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as the principal guarantees of political
liberty. .. . the structure of our political system accounts no less for the free society we
have"); Harlan & Stewart, supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that the federal system is a "strong
pillar of political liberty"); see also supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
29. In fact, the very decline in political activity that Harlan feared and warned of in
the 1950s and 1960s did materialize. See Richard L. Berke, Lightest Turnout in 40 Years
is Seen, N.Y. TIRM/,Oct. 22, 1988, at Al (discussing the "downward trend in election
turnouts since 1960"); Curtis B. Cans, America's Voters Are Right to BeAngry, NEWSDAY,
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Second, Harlan felt that a constant recognition of the Supreme Court's
limited role in our federal system was essential to maintain continued
national respect for the Court and the Constitution. In Wesberry, he stated
that the stability of the Court "ultimately depends ... upon recognition
of the limitations on the Court's own functions in the constitutional
system."' Similarly, in Mapp v. Ohio3t he said that the "Court can
increase respect for the Constitution only if it rigidly respects the

limitations which the Constitution places upon it."32 Thus, according to
Harlan, when the Court fails to pay due heed to principles of federalism
and steps outside of its limited role, it invites a lessening of public respect
for both itself as an institution of law, and for the Constitution as well.
Additionally, Justice Harlan believed that one of the principal benefits
of our federal system was the ability of states to experiment with novel

and divergent policies. Echoing the views of Justice Brandeis, Harlan said

in Chapman v. California0 that it is "that opportunity for" broad
experimentation which is the genius of our federal system. ' This

Nov. 11, 1988, at 93 (Nassau & Suffolk ed.) (stating that "[s]ince 1960, the United States
has witnessed a more than 20[%] decline in voter turnout"). On the state level, only an
estimated 26.6% of California's adult citizens voted in that state's 1990 primary elections,
down from 28.5% in 1986 and 44.8% in 1966. Robert Reinhold, Apathy and Disaffection
on the Rise Among California Voters, N.Y. TiMBi, June 12, 1990, at A14. Similarly, only
approximately 20% of Georgia's electorate turned out for its 1990 primaries, and in Kansas
"nonvoters outnumbered voters nearly three to one." Richard Harwood, Virus in the
Newsrooms, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1990, at C6; see also Susan Gilmore & Ross
Anderson, PublicSours on PoliticalSystem, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 1990, at Al (stating
that "a majority of Washingtonians feel alienated from politics, that they are outsiders in
a system that spins beyond their control").
30. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 340 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "continuing national respect for
the Court's authority depends in large measure upon its wise exercise of self-restraint and
discipline in constitutional adjudication").
31. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32. Id. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
34. Id. at 48 (Harlan, I., dissenting). Harlan's views on state experimentation are
based largely on those expressed by Justiec Brandeis some fifty years earlier. See Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). In New State Ice,
Justice Brandeis said: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice, 285 U.S. at
311. For a criticism of this theory, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking and Reelection:
Does Federalism Promote Innovation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing that the
reelection motive of local politicians impedes innovation and that few useful experiments
will be carried out by the states).
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opportunity is valuable because it allows states to tailor rules of law to
variant local wants And needs. More importantly, it fosters progress and

development in the law by permitting individual states to experiment with
new social and economic policies-policies that might involve too much
risk to be tested on a national scale.
Accordingly, Harlan often spoke out in dissent when the Court

imposed what he viewed as unnecessary or inappropriate national
standards. "[C]ompelled uniformity," he said, "is inconsistent with the
purpose of our federal system."3' Harlan found national standards
undesirable because they halt the invaluable process of state

experimentation. He articulated this position most vehemently in his
concurrence in Ker v. Califomia,' in which he referred to the Court's

creation of a single, nationwide standard for searches and seizures as "a
constitutional strait jacket. "I
35. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172 (stating that the Due Process Clause "does not... impose or
encourage nationwide uniformity for its own sake").
36. 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 45; see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (also referring to incorporation as a "constitutional straitjacket"); Duncan, 391
U.S. at 175-76 (same). Harlan found national uniformity particularly unsettling in areas
uniquely suited for state experimentation. For example, in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), he said that "the
dangers of federal censorship in [the area of obscenity regulation] are far greater than
anything the States may do." Id. at 505. After explaining the advantages of state
experimentation and the likely divergence of attitudes toward the same piece of literature
in different states, he said:
No overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment and to gratify our tastes
in literature is likely to result from the suppression of a borderline book in one
of the States, so long as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression of the book,
and so long as other States are free to experiment with the same or bolder books
But the dangers to free thought and expression are truly great if the Federal
Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation on such a book. The
prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of morality will be destroyed,
the ability of the States to experiment will be stunted.
Id. at 506. Similarly, Harlan viewed the field of law enforcement as especially appropriate
for state experimentation. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with a
common problem of law enforcement is especially appropriate here"). The divergence in
local conditions and the wide variety of methods for dealing with the problem render such
issues as the promulgation of rules of evidence and the right to a jury trial in noncapital
cases most suitable for local determination and, in Harlan's view, wholly inappropriate for
nationwide federal requirements. See id. (rules of evidence); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (right to a jury trial in noneapital cases).
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Harlan acknowledged that the process of experimentation may, of
course, lead to the adoption of uniform standards nationwide, but he found

such consensus among the states entirely acceptable. Harlan's theory of
experimentation posits that, in some areas, optimal policies will be
discovered and will be adopted by other states; the states will watch and
learn from one another, rejecting those policies that have failed elsewhere

and adopting those that have met with success. Although such a system
may lead to national uniformity in some areas, it does not mandate such

a result. If a particular state's needs change, it remains free to modify its
rules of law. In this manner, the law remains responsive to the needs of

the people it is meant to govern. Thus, Harlan was not opposed to
uniformity per se-only compelled, federally-imposed uniformity, in areas

of law better left to the states.
C. Constitutional Limitations on State Autonomy
Justice Harlan's conception of federalism constrained all units of

government within the federal system. Although the discussion thus far
has focused on limitations on the scope of federal power, he also placed
significant restrictions upon the states. To Harlan, the main constitutional
limitations on state authority were the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the existence of enumerated federal powers

"carved out" from the realm of state sovereignty. 38
1. Due Process

Harlan frequently spoke out in strong protest against the selective
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment of the rights and principles
in the Bill of Rights, thus making them applicable against the states. 9 He
38. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not significantly
employed as a constitutional limitation on state autonomy until well into Harlan's tenure
on the Court. See Stephen Dane, "Ordered LibeMly" and Self-Restraint: The Judicial
Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 545, 559 (1982). It was not
until the late 1960s that the Court began applying strict scrutiny to state policies
discriminating against certain groups of individuals or infringing upon fundamental personal
rights. See id. at 559 & n.46. Harlan was opposed to this expansion of the Equal Protection
Clause; in contexts other than race, he felt that such issues should be examined under
traditional heightened due process analysis, rather than a new standard of equal protection
review. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
saw the Court's expansive interpretation of the Clause as yet another vehicle for the
imposition of its own values and political ideology on the rest of the coun ry. See Dane,
supra, at 560-61. But cf. infra note 171 (suggesting that Harlan may have concurred in the
use of the strict-scrutiny standard, once established and applied by a majority of the Court,
out of respect for precedent).
39. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
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preferred to take a broader view of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause as protecting those rights "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'"'4 Yet, although he disagreed with the majority of the

Court as to the precise contours of the Clause, he agreed with his peers
as to the standards to apply when judging the constitutionality of state
policies thereunder. Those policies involving simple social welfare
regulation should be upheld if rationally related to a valid state

objective.4 ' State laws alleged to encroach upon fundamental personal

liberties, however, required more: they must be "fundamentally fair in all
respects." 42 Thus, Harlan believed that the term "liberty" in the

Fourteenth Amendment "is a rational continuum which... [recognizes]
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgment."'

One fundamental right that Harlan regularly enforced against state
encroachment was the right of free expression. For example, in Street v.

New York," writing for the majority in overturning a state flag-burning
conviction! and mindful of the competing interests at issue in the case,
he declared: "[D]isrespect for our flag is to be deplored .
Nevertheless, we are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested
on a form of expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution
tolerates and protects."4
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
21-27 (1964) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (quoting Justice Cardozo's classic expression of this
approach in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see also Malloy, 378 U.S.
at 21-27 (also citing Palko).
41. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 662 (stating that in areas of social welfare regulation,
due process bars only patently arbitrary action with no rational justification).
42. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that statutes restricting important fundamental liberties
should not be upheld upon a simple showing that the law is rationally related to a valid
state purpose; "[a] closer scrutiny and stronger justification than that are required").
43. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (citations omitted).
44. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
45. Id. at 593-94. Street was convicted for malicious mischief when, upon heating a
news report of the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith, he set fire to a folded
American flag on a street comer, while saying "[w]e don't need no damn flag.... If they
let that happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag." Id. at 578-79. The statute
under which he was convicted prohibited casting "contempt upon [an American flag] either
by words or act." Id. at 578. Reserving the issue of whether one could be convicted solely
for the act of flag burning, the Court found that Street's conviction may have rested on
both his actions and his words, and therefore reversed. See id. at 590, 594.
46. Id. at 594.
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Similarly, in Cohen v. Califomia," Harlan wrote for the majority in
holding that the State of California could'"not, consistently with the First

and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display... [of a]
single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."" While acknowledging

that the states generally have broad power to regulate issues of morality
within their borders, Harlan made clear that this power is not without

limits. "Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point

where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us."49
In attempting to do so, the State of California had stepped outside of its

role in our federal system.
Another fundamental right that Harlan viewed as a significant
constitutional limitation on the exercise of state power was the right of

privacy. Harlan discovered the right of marital privacy in Poe v.

Ullman,' in which the Court-as it did again four years later in
Griswold v. Connecticut t---considered the constitutionality of

Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples.
Although a majority of the Court rejected the challenge as

nonjusticiable,52 Harlan believed that the case was properly before the
Court, and went on to a lengthy discussion on the merits. After a careful
and thorough explanation of his conclusion, he found that "the

Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable

intrusion of whatever character."'53 This protection was not limited to a
47. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
48. Id. at 26. Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace, for walking through the
corridor of a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket upon which the words "Fuck the
Draft" had been written. See id. at 16. For an insightful and expansive treatment of the
facts and issues involved in this case, see Daniel Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse:An
Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v.
California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283.
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25. Throughout the opinion, Harlan made it clear that he
found Cohen's choice of words offensive. He referred to Cohen's jacket as "crudely
defaced" and bearing an "unseemly expletive" or an "offensive word." Id. at 20, 23.
Despite his own opinions regarding Cohen's chosen expression, however, Harlan saw great
danger in its suppression. "[We cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.
Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views." Id. at 26. For a more
complete study of Justice Harlan's views on free expression, see Daniel Farber & John
Nowak, Justice Harlan and the FirstAmendinent, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 425 (1985).
50. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508-09. Both the plurality and the concurring opinions concluded
that the appeals should be dismissed since the statute had not been enforced against either
the married appellants or the doctor bringing the appeal. See id. at 508-09.
53. Id. at 550. Harlan found the right of privacy to be a fundamental right, a "part of
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prohibition of physical invasion, but extended to the private realm of
family life as well.' Since the state had chosen to invade this
fundamental right without justification, Harlan found its statute in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
Though undoubtedly the States are and should be left free to
reflect a wide variety of policies, and should be allowed broad
scope in experimenting with various means of promoting those
policies, I must agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that "There are
limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority
may conduct.
experiments at the expense of the dignity and
personality" of the individual. In this instance these limits are, in
my view, reached and passed.'
With the possible exception of his creation of the right of marital
privacy, Harlan is probably best known for his frequent refusal to join the
majority of the Court in its expansion of the rights of state criminal
defendants. His frequent dissent in this area was not based on a belief that
criminal defendants did not "deserve" the particular protection afforded
by the majority, but on his determination that the rights or procedures
imposed by the Court, while perhaps desirable, were not essential to basic
fairness and thus not compelled by the Constitution. 57 If other fair

methods or procedures were available, the Court had no business
mandating particular policies; if there was more than one fair method to
choose from, the selection of the most desirable option was a matter of
state-not federal-concern.
2. "Carved Out" Federal Powers
Justice Harlan believed that when the states granted Congress the
authority in the Constitution to act in certain areas, they simultaneously
the 'ordered liberty' assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 549.
54. See id. at 551-52.
55. See id. at 554-55.
56. Id. at 555 (citation omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546
(1942) (Jackson, I., concurring)).
57. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[lit simply has not been demonstrated, nor, I think, can it be demonstrated, that trial by
jury is the only fair means of resolving issues of fact."); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, I., dissenting) (rejecting "the Court's new constitutional
code of rules for confessions" as inconsistent with precedent and not required by due
process); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
application of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the states).
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relinquished the power to regulate these fields. In short, federal power
was "carved out" of state sovereignty 8 He expressed this view most
clearly in his opinion for the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 9 in which he

upheld the 1961 and 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
extending the Act's applicability to state employees. Although it appears
that Harlan may have felt compelled by precedent in concluding as he
did,' he considered and rejected the "sovereign state functions"

argument put forth by the State of Maryland." Specifically, he deemed
"untenable" the argument that "the Act may not be constitutionally applied
to state-operated institutions because that power must yield to state
sovereignty in the performance of governmental fumctions."' "[T]here

is no general 'doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that "the two
governments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not
to interfere with the free and full exercise of the power of the other."'" '
"Valid general regulations of commerce," he said, "do not cease to be
regulations of commerce because a State is involved." 6
Thus, in Wirtz, Harlan clearly articulated his belief that federal power
is "carved out" of the scope of state authority. "'The sovereign power of
the States,'" he said, "'is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants
of power to the federal government in the Constitution.'" ' In sum, the
federal government has full power to act in those areas where the states

chose to grant it the authority to do so. Such is the sphere of federal
authority, separate and distinct from state, power.'
58. For an early explication of the "carving out" theory, see Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
59. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
60. See id. at 188, 198 (stating that "the constitutionality . . is settled by the
reasoning of [United States v.] Darby" and that "[tihe principle of United States v.
CaWifornia is controlling here").
61. Id. at 193-99.
62. Id. at 195.
63. Id. (quoting Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946)).
64. Id. at 196-97.
65. Id. at 198 (quoting United States v. California, 275 U.S. 175, 184 (1936)).
66. Harlan adhered to this view in another context in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971), in which he joined that part of the majority's opinion that held the state law
in question unconstitutional on the basis of federal-state relations. See id. at 383 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part); see also id. at 376-83 (portion of majority opinion joined by
Harlan). The Court held that a state cannot make law contrary to the will of Congress in
areas where the latter has been delegated power to act-in this case, the power to make
rules regarding aliens and naturalization--"[s]ince such laws encroach upon the exclusive
federal power." Id. at 380.
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D. The Court, Reform, and Federalism
It was Harlan's views regarding to the Court's role as an organ for
social reform that set him furthest apart from his peers on the Warren
Court and that most frequently led him to dissent. To Harlan-a foremost

advocate and practitioner of judicial restraint-the Court was not meant
to serve as a forum for social change. Principles of federalism mandated
that the states-not the Court-were to effect such movements. In his

dissent in Reynolds v. Sims,67 he stated both his own views in this respect

and those he believed to be displayed in and fostered by the activist
decisions of the majority. He suggested that the Court had been swept
away by
a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional
function of this Court . . . that every major social ill in this
country can find its cure in some constitutional "principle," and
that this Court should "take the lead" in promoting reform when
other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not
a panaceafor every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this
Court . . . be thought of as a general haven for reform

movements. 68

Harlan frequently criticized the majority of the Court for its

"insensitivity to the appropriate dividing lines between the judicial and
political functions under our constitutional system."' He felt that the
Court often took action which, although acceptable had it come from a
legislature, was entirely inappropriate for constitutional determination by
the Court.' In many cases, he believed that the majority was doing
An exception that Harlan recognized to this mutually exclusive view of sovereign
authority was the federal taxing power. In this field, the federal government is restricted
from acting in those areas traditionally occupied by the states. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198.
This difference in treatment, however, is explained by the nature and history of this grant
of power to the federal government, both of which clearly demonstrate that this power was
intended to be concurrent. Id.
67. 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 624-25 (emphasis added).
69. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1967) ("To say that.., we
might well agree [that the two-stage jury trial is fairest] were the matter before us in a
legislative or rule-maklng context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination that this
method .. .is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It is of course entirely fitting
that legislatures should modify the law to reflect such changes in popular attitudes.
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nothing more than substituting its own judgment as to the wisdom of
policies for the determinations of the states and Congress, thus perverting
the balance of power and authority set out in the Constitution. 7
He expressed this view most cogently in his dissent in Wesbeny v.
Sanders,' in which he criticized the Court for "substitut[ing] its own
judgment"' for that of the states and Congress "for no reason other than
it seems wise to the majority of the present Court."74 "The Constitution
does not confer on the Court blanket authority to step into every situation
where the political branch may be thought to have fallen short."' And
in dissent in Carrington v. Rash,76 in a tone verging on outright anger,
he said: "I deplore . . . the current tendency of judging constitutional
questions on the basis of abstract 'justice' unleashed from the limiting
principles that go with our constitutional system."'
Harlan also pointed to a number of "defects inherent in any judicially
imposed solution of a complex social problem. " ' "A judicial decision
which is founded simply on the impulse that 'something should be done'
or which looks no further than to the 'justice' or 'injustice' of a particular
case is not likely to have lasting influence."' While state-based
legislative reform may be slow, Harlan saw it as a far better vehicle for
lasting social change. He acknowledged that legislative reforms are "rarely
speedy or unanimous" but believed that they "would have the vast
advantage of empirical data and comprehensive study ...and.., would
restore the initiative . . . [for] reform to those forums where it truly
However, it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines
popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history

... .

71. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court imposed on all states a good, but not demonstrably better, means of
trying criminal cases); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for substituting its own superficial assessment for the careful and
better informed conclusions of the state court); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court substituted its views for the
amending process).
72. 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. at48; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 46-47 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court's assumption of a "general supervisory power over the
trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts [is] a startling constitutional development
that is wholly out of keeping with our federal system").
76. 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 98-99 (emphasis added).
78. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 494 (1968) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
79. Harlan, supra note 2, at 944.
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belongs."' Furthermore, Harlan believed that the Court was often too
far removed from the problem at issue to render an adequate solution, 8
and he frequently pointed to the difficulty of "undoing" the Court's
decisions.'
Strict application of the principles of federalism to constitutional
claims, however, can put a Justice in the precarious position of upholding
a state policy to which he is personally opposed. Harlan frequently found
himself in this position. In many cases he quite plainly expressed his
disagreement with a state's policy which, however repugnant to his own
personal philosophy, he felt obliged to uphold absent proof of a clear
constitutional violation.' To Harlan, the question was never whether he
favored or disfavored the state policy, but only whether the Court could,
consistently with the Constitution, demand that it be changed." In many
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 525 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan
frequently criticized the majority for its impatience with the slow workings of political
reform. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court cannot exceed its constitutional authority to satisfy justified
impatience with the slow workings of the political process); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the preservation of the proper balance
between state and federal authority requires patience on the part of those who would like
to see things move faster).
81. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 32 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority is "unfamiliar with Connecticut law and far removed from the proceedings
below"); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 623 (asserting that the problems before the Court in this
case are far removed from filds of judicial competence).
82. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 89 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[S]hort of future action by this Court, thel impact [of this decision] can only be undone
or modified by the slow and uncertain process of constitutional amendment.").
83. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Much as I would prefer to see free transcripts furnished to indigent defendants in all
felony cases, I find myself unable to join in the Court's holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a State to do so .... ."); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 476
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a state prisoner's "predicament may well
be thought one that strongly calls for correction" but concluding that federal courts have
no power to release a state prisoner whose conviction rests on an adequate and independent
state ground).
84. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 339 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting
that "one need not agree, as a citizen, with what Tennessee has done or failed to do, in
order to deprecate, as a judge, what the majority is doing today"). Harlan believed that
constitutional issues should be decided through the uniform application of neutral principles,
not on the basis of generalized (or personalized) notions of "right" or "wrong." His
decisions were driven by reason, not result. See Harlan, supra note 2, at 944 ("Our scheme
of ordered liberty is based ... on enlightened and uniformly applied legal principle, not
on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in a particular case."); see also Bourguignon,
supra note 7, at 289 ("Justice Harlan . . . consistently strove for the goal of neutral,
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cases he did not disagree with the majority as to the need for change, but
only as to its proper forum. He articulated this view in his dissent in
Griffin v. Illinois:'
[R]egard for our system of federalism requires that matters such
as this be left to the States. However strong may be one's
inclination to hasten the day when in forma pauperis criminal
procedures will be universal among the States, I think it is beyond
the province of this Court to tell Illinois that it must provide such
procedures.m
Justice Harlan believed that the Court's continued activism would lead
to "a substantial transfer of legislative power to the courts."' Such
action would result in "a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial
independence and, on the other, of legislative responsibility." 88
Furthermore, "[t]he promise of judicial intervention cannot but encourage
popular inertia." 9 These statements demonstrate Harlan's belief that
continued regard for the proper roles of the federal courts and the state
legislatures is essential to keep the political system functioning as
intended.'
In the end, Harlan felt that respect for our federal system would do
far more to protect the rights of individuals and effect lasting social
change than would an active judiciary. With this hope, he continuously
counseled for due consideration of the established functions of the states
and the federal government in the American system.

principled decision making."). For a convincing example of Harlan's refusal to be dictated
by the outcome of a case, see Jenldns v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The majority in this case held that the standards established in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not apply to persons whose retrials began after that
decision, if their original trials had started before it. See Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 222-23. In
dissent, Harlan said: "As one who has never agreed with the Miranda case but nonetheless
felt bound by it, I now find myself in the uncomfortable position of having to dissent from
a holding which actually serves to curtail the impact of that decision." Id. at 222 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
85. 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 39.
87. Harlan, supra note 2, at 944. Harlan further stated that a "function more ill-suited
to judges can hardly be imagined." Id.
88. Id.
89. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 48 (1964) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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Ill. JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S FEDERALISM: AUTONOMY AND ACTIvIsM

A. In a Word: Autonomy
After Justice Harlan left the Supreme Court in 1971, William Hubbs
Rehnquist was appointed to fill his seat on the bench. Like his

predecessor, Justice Rehnquist places grand importance on what he calls
federalism." Rehnquist's conception of federalism, however, does not

involve the same "balance" that Harlan sought so steadfastly to preserve.
Rather, to Justice Rehnquist the word federalism appears near synonymous
with such terms as "state autonomy" and "local self-rule. "I His opinions
evince a view that the states have a right to function without federal
interference,' and he believes that it is his duty, as a Supreme Court
Justice, to ensure this autonomy.' According to one commentator,

Rehnquist seeks to "restore to the states, by judicial fiat, the 'sovereignty,
freedom and independence' that the Articles of Confederation
guaranteed."95

The centerpiece of Justice Rehnquist's theory of federalism is his socalled "state sovereignty doctrine." Under this doctrine, as initially laid
out in his dissent in Fry v. United States' and later developed in his
91. Most scholars who have considered the issue agree that Rehnquist, like Harlan,
places federalism at the forefront of his judicial philosophy. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note
6, at 33 (stating that Rehnquist assigns preeminent value to the principles of federalism);
Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J.
1317, 1320 (1982) (asserting that federalism is Rehnquist's "constitutional first principle").
92. See Nancy Maveeti, The Populist of the Adversary Society: The Jurisprudence of
Justice Rehnquist, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 221, 222 (1987) (asserting that Rehnquist thinks
"It]hejudicial role is... to protect the structural integrity of local and state government");
Powell, supra note 91, at 1367 (stating that "the idea of state sovereignty ... is crucial
to Justice Rehnquist's theory of federalism"); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A
Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 294 (1976) (stating that Rehnquist is guided by
the principle that "[clonflicts between state and federal authority . . . should, whenever
possible, be resolved in favor of the states").
93. See Powell, supra note 91, at 1331.
94. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 159 (stating that Rehnquist's "goal [is to] protect[]
states from the federal courts"); Powell, supra note 91, at 1333 (asserting that Rehnquist
believes the Court must "preserve state law against displacement").
95. Powell, supra note 91, at 1369 (quoting ARTS. CONFED. art. II).
96. 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Fry, the Court considered
the wage and salary restrictions of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, and concluded
that the Act was constitutional as applied to state and local government employees. See id.
at 548. Justice Rehnquist, however, dissented. See id. at 549. In his view, the Act was not
a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, since it interfered
with the States' traditional government functions. See id. at 559.
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opinion for the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery,l each state

has a "constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free
from . . . congressionally asserted authority." 9 8 Thus, according to
Rehnquist, states possess an "inherent affirmative constitutional limitation
on congressional power."' In the context of the Commerce Clause, this

translates into a rule that Congress, when acting pursuant to its
constitutionally delegated power to regulate commerce, cannot regulate

states "as States" 1" when the federal legislation would interfere with the

states' integral or traditional government functions. 10 1 Without such a
rule, "there would be little left of the States' 'separate and independent
existence.'"" Thus, unlike Harlan, Rehnquist does not see the powers
delegated to the federal government as entirely plenary."
In order to establish his state sovereignty doctrine in Usery, Rehnquist
had to overrule the Court's previous decision in Maryland v. Wirtz."
In Wirtz, Justice Harlan led the majority of the Court in specifically
97. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the Court considered and held unconstitutional the
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending the Act's maximum wage and
minimum hour provisions to virtually all state and local government employees. See id. at
852. According to Rehnquist, "the dispositive factor [was] that Congress [had] attempted
to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum
hours to be paid by the states in their capacities as sovereign governments." Id. Although
this doctrine was never widely applied and was eventually rejected in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), it is central to Rehnquist's theory of
federalism. Interestingly, when the doctrine was overruled in Garcia, Rehnquist did not put
up much of a fight. He met the challenge with a four sentence dissent, in which he simply
pointed out the faults in, but joined, the other two dissents and said that he did not think
"it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that
will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Id.
at 580. Harlan would surely have scomed such an open abdication ofjudicial responsibility.
98. Fry, 421 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
101. See id. at 851, 852; Powell, supra note 91, at 1329. According to Powell, "the
precedents supporting this doctrine were never identified." Id.
102. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
103. Professor Sue Davis says that Rehnquist
has developed his own doctrine to limit Congress's power when state
governmental functions are involved. Not only has he interpreted Congress's
enumerated powers in a restricted way, but he has also maintained that even
when Congress acts pursuant to its enumerated powers, it transgresses its
constitutional limits when it infringes on state autonomy.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 149.
104. See Usey, 426 U.S. at 855 (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968)).
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rejecting the state sovereignty doctrine that Rehnquist adopted in
Usery.1° While Harlan's decision in Wirtz was firmly grounded in

precedent," ° Rehnquist overruled the case on the basis of "the
conclusions expressed earlier in [his] opinion""° and the belief that one
of the cases upon which Wirtz was based-a case that the Court had
accepted without question for nearly forty years -was "simply
wrong. " 109
Rehnquist's version of federalism involves a commitment not only to
the protection of state policy, but to community autonomy as well. 1t His
views on local self-rule are well exemplified by his dissent in Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder,"' in which he claimed that "local
government would be disabled""1 by the majority's refusal to extend to

municipalities the state action exemption from the Sherman Act. Under the
majority's holding, a "municipality's power to regulate the economy
would be all but destroyed."13 He saw no reason for treating
municipalities any differently from states in this context, 11 ' and criticized

the Court for its "startling conclusion that our federalism is in no way
implicated"" 5
ordinance. 116

when

a

federal

statutes

invalidates

a

municipal

105. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193-99 (1968); see also supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text.
106. See Witz, 392 U.S. at 188 (concluding that the constitutionality of the
amendment is settled by principles in prior cases); see also supra note 60 and
accompanying text. Beyond the initial discussion of the factual background in Wirtz, there
is scarcely a paragraph in the entire opinion that does not contain some discussion of case
law.
107. Usery, 426 U.S. at 854.
108. The case was United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which, acc6rding
to Shepard's Citations, had not been questioned or criticized since it was decided in 1936.
See'2C SHEPARD'S UNIrED STATES CrrATIONS: CAsES 171 (6th ed. 1988).
109. Usery, 426 U.S. at 854-55.
110. See Maveety, supra note 92, at 222 (stating that Rehnquist sees "local autonomy
as a necessary condition of the active, enlightened participation upon which our government
order is based").
111. 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
112. Id. at66.
113. Id. at 67.
114. See id.at 68.
115. Id. at 69.
116. The majority of the Court viewed federalism in the traditional context of federalstate relations, and therefore concluded that only states-not their political
subdivisions-were sovereigns entitled to protection by the values of federalism. See id.
at 52.
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The unusual aspect of Rehnquist's Community Communications

opinion is his concern with state-local relations.1 17 This element most
pointedly displays the value at the heart of his theory of federalism: local
self-rule."' Rehnquist concluded that the Court's holding would

"radically alter the relationship between the States and their political

subdivisions."" 9 He described the "'home rule' movement," "
through which municipal governments have struggled to obtain some
autonomy over local matters (a movement Rehnquist clearly appears to

favor), then claimed that this trend would soon be reversed. Under the
majority's holding, "the home
rule municipality will have to cede its
12

authority back to the State." '

Rehnquist's federalism thus involves a multi-tiered approach. Not only

must the states be protected from the tyranny of the federal government,
but the autonomy of localities must be defended against encroachment by
the states as well."2 In contrast with Harlan's "delicate balance," Justice
117. See id. at 70-71.
118. For an interesting take on the notion of community self-governance, see ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). In Nozick's utopia, the central
government is limited in its functions solely to (1) protecting its citizens against violence,
theft, and fraud, and (2) enforcing contracts. See id. at 26. Judging from Rehnquist's
opinions, it seems he may find Nozick's theory of governance appealing. For a criticism
of Nozick's theory, especially his acceptance of the social and economic status quo as fair,
since he views it as the result of uncoerced, consensual transactions, see G.A. Cohen, SelfOwnership, Word-Ownership andEquality, in JUSTICE AND EQUA.ITY HERE AND NOW 108

(Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986).
119. Comnmunity Communications, 455 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 71.
121. Id.
122. A notable deviation from Rehnquist's protection of state and local autonomy
appears in his opinion for the Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), in
which he upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress conditioning receipt of federal
highway funds upon states' imposition of a minimum drinking age of 21, even though
Congress lacked the power to mandate such a condition directly. Rehnquist held that
Congress may act indirectly, via the spending power, to displace state policy in an area not
only of traditional state control, but one arguably entrusted to the states by the Twenty-first
Amendment. See id. at 206-12. Although it has long been accepted that Congress may
condition the grant of federal funds upon states' compliance with federal requirements
related to the grant, see Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), the condition
here (minimum drinking age) was only tenuously related to the purpose of the grant
(highway construction). See Dole, 483 U.S. at 218 (O'Connor, I., dissenting). Given his
usual pro-state stance, it is surprising that Rehnquist did not join either O'Connor or
Brennan's dissent in this case. See id. at 212, 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting, and O'Connor,
J., dissenting). He definitely had adequate grounds to do so: this was an area of traditional
state regulation; the condition was not directly related to the purpose of the grant; the
Twenty-first Amendment arguably prohibited federal regulation; the area appeared suitable
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Rehnquist's federalism places a heavy weight on the state side of the scale.
B. Rehnquist's Undeveloped Justifications
Unlike Justice Harlan, Rehnquist does not thoroughly explain why he

is so committed to his brand of federalism. His opinions are filled with
claims of devastating effects upon state and local autonomy'2' and "our
federal system,"" but beyond such rhetoric he does little to support his
approach.
Rehnquist's most common justification for his extreme concern with
state and local autonomy is (his version of) the intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution. For Rehnquist, "[tihe general rule remains
'the original understanding at Philadelphia'-state freedom from federal
interference." 1" He applied this rule in Nevada v. Hall," in which
he seemed to base his dissent entirely on his determination that the
decision below was incompatible with the intent of the framers. He said:
"[T]he Framers... 'expressed the appropriate limits on the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity. Since the California judgment under review

transgresses those limits, I respectfully dissent.""' While it is not
unusual for a Justice to consider or seek to ascertain the intent of the

for experimentation (what makes 21 the best age? why not 19? or 25?). Considering the
viability of such arguments and Rehnquist's usual willingness to assume an activist role in
the name of state autonomy, his pro-federal stance in this case seems, to say the least,
somewhat surprising.
123. See, e.g., Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 60, 66-67 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
124. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 550 (1975) (Rchnquist, J.,
dissenting).
125. Powell, supra note 91, at 1327. Powell also says that "Rehnquist has argued that
the constitutional first principle intended by the Framers was the maintenance of the federal
system and the dignity and autonomy of the states." Id. at 1320 (emphasis added).
Rehnquist clearly is most concerned with the latter of these goals. Furthermore, although
"state freedom from federal interference," id. at 1327, may have been the goal of the AntiFederalists, see generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986), it is unlikely that state autonomy was
a primary aim of a majority of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution, a group that
included such great nationalists as Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, and-at least
in terms of their pre-Convention views-James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
126. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
127. Id. at443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
777-78 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "cannot
be read apart from the original understanding at Philadelphia" and condemning its
application "[c]xcept in the area of the law in which the Framers obviously meant it to
apply").

1991]

NOTE

framers and ratifiers, Rehnquist often sees original intent as both
determinable and dispositive. Unlike Harlan, he frequently views what he
perceives to be the framers' intent as an end to the debate, rather than a
starting point for a discussion of precedent and modern-day considerations.
Akin to his reliance on original intent, Rehnquist often refers to
"notions of a constitutional plan""2 to support his theory of federalism
and its application. He does not, however, clearly explain this concept. In
his dissent in Hall, he defined the "constitutional plan" as "the implicit
ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the
Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision
within that document the full effect intended by the Framers.""'
Without the "tacitpostulates yielded by that ordering... the Constitution
is denied force and often meaning."" 3 Unfortunately, he never explained
what he meant by this "implicit ordering," nor did he define its "tacit
postulates" or say how or why both were necessary to give meaning to the
Constitution."'
Further on in Hall, he urged that concepts of state sovereignty "are
of constitutional dimension because their derogation would undermine the
logic of the constitutional scheme,"132 again without explaining how this
would occur. Similarly, in his dissent in Fry v. United States,133
Rehnquist objected to the Court's holding on the basis of a "danger to our
federal system" which "seem[ed] to [him] quite manifest," 1" without
explaining or describing this purported threat. Without further
development, such claims do little, if anything, to rationalize his theory
of federalism.
Like Harlan, Justice Rehnquist sometimes points to the desirability of
state experimentation as a reason for respecting state and local autonomy.
Unlike Harlan, however, he fails fully to articulate why such a process is
valuable, or why compelled uniformity would be undesirable. In his
dissent in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder,135 for example,

128. E.g., Hall, 440 U.S. at 432 passim.
129. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. In a footnote, Rehnquist credits Justice John Marshall for his expression of this
idea in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), and quotes a passage
from that case which, unfortunately, does little to help define the concept. See Hall, 440
U.S. at 433 n. 1. Thereafter, the only opinions Rehnquist cites to as embodying this notion
are his own. See id. at 434.
132. Hall, 440 U.S. at 439.
133. 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 550.
135. 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4WREVIEW

[VCOL. 36

Rehnquist said that under the majority's rule, "[fhis country's
municipalities will be unable to experiment with innovative social
programs," 1" after which he simply cited Justice Brandeis's oft-quoted
discussion of state experimentation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. "

Similarly, in dissent in Santosky v. Kramer,"' he declared that the field
of domestic relations was "an area where this Court should encourage
state experimentation,"139 without any discussion as to why this should
be so. Contrasted with Harlan's often lengthy expositions on the
appropriateness of particular areas of law for state experimentation, "0

Rehnquist's occasional and undeveloped reference to this concept does
little to support his deference to state and local policymakers.
C. ConstitutionalLimitations on State Autonomy

Justice Rehnquist articulates very few limits on state autonomy. He
recognizes few explicit constitutional limitations, and narrowly construes
those which he must acknowledge.14 Rehnquist's belief that Congress's

power under the Commerce Clause does not extend to traditional areas of
state sovereignty 42 precludes his acceptance of Harlan's view that states
may not act in those areas in which they delegated power to the federal
government.1" Thus, Rehnquist's primary-albeit minimal-limitations
on state and local autonomy are found in the Due Process Clause and
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Due Process
Like Harlan, Rehnquist stands opposed to the selective incorporation

of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
136. Id. at 67.
137. See id. (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of Brandeis's theory of experimentation, see
supra note 34.
138. 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 773.
140. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-07 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying
text.
141. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 32 (stating that Rehnquist "has given constitutional
provisions protecting individual rights the narrowest possible construal"); Powell, supra
note 91, at 1349 (asserting that Rehnquist is "extremely reluctant to find that state law is
invalid either because it conflicts with federal legislation or with the commerce clause").
142. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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Clause. 1" The Justices differ, however, in their methods of determining

what kinds of rights are protected by the Clause. With respect to its

procedural guarantees, Rehnquist has deemed state law as determinative
of the Clause's scope. In Paul v. Davis,45 he said that

there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition
but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either
"liberty" or "property" as meant in the Due Process Clause.
These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact

that 1they have been initially recognized and protected by state
law.

4

The narrowness of Rehnquist's approach to due process as protective

of only a "finite class of liberty" 47 contrasts sharply with Harlan's

belief that the federal courts can recognize and protect individual rights

beyond those asserted "by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of

Rights,"'" regardless of whether a state has chosen to recognize
them.' 49 The fact that Rehnquist "relegates individual rights to the
bottom of his hierarchy of values"" 5 becomes clear when one compares

the two Justices' standards of review under the Due Process Clause. While
Harlan advocated careful examination of claims involving fundamental

personal rights to ensure that the challenged laws were "fundamentally fair
in all respects,"'

Rehnquist applies the fundamental fairness standard

144. See Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 989 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(referring to the selective incorporation of Sixth Amendment into Fourteenth as a "judicial
building block"); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 308 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(terming the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination a
"mysterious process of transmogrification"); see also DAVIS supra note 6, at 203 (noting
Rehnquist's opposition to the incorporation doctrine).
145. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
146. Id. at 710 (emphasis added). In a footnote, Rehnquist stated that this discussion
was limited to consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause, and
not intended to relate to the "other interests" protected by virtue of their incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise. See id. at 710 n.5. It is noteworthy that he chose
to relegate this rather significant limitation to a footnote.
147. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
149. See Powell, supra note 91, at 1358.
150. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 19; see also Shapiro, supra note 92, at 294, in which
Professor Shapiro states that Rehnquist's decision making appears to be guided by three
principles, including the view that "[elonflicts between an individual and the government
should, whenever possible, be resolved against the individual." Id.
151. Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
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As to all other

types of policies, he requires only a "rational relation to a valid state
objective" to uphold the state law."
It is not surprising, then, that Rehnquist is not a great champion of the

right of free expression,"5 a right Harlan saw as a substantial restriction
on state authority.155 For example, in his dissent in Smith v.
Goguen,1" Rehnquist voted to affirm Goguen's conviction for
contemptuous treatment of the American flag under a Massachusetts "flag
misuse statute,"' 57 for "walking in the downtown business district...
wearing a short coat, casual type pants and a miniature American flag

sewn on the left side of his pants." '

A year later, again in dissent,

Rehnquist rejected a theatrical promoter's claim that its First Amendment
rights were implicated when a municipal theatre board refused to provide
a public forum for the musical Hair without ever having seen the play or
'
are
When Rehnquist's decisions in this area
read the script. 59

supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
152. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 866 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Due Process Clause assures fundamental fairness in state criminal
proceedings). Justice Rehnquist has consistently refused to apply the fundamental fairness
standard outside of the criminal context, and has dissented when the majority of the Court
has done so on the ground that the rights protected are fundamental, insisting that such
claims should be analyzed under a rational-relation standard. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right to marry); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right to abortion). He
criticized the notion of "fundamental personal rights" in his dissent in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which he
concluded that the determination of such rights and the application of a higher standard of
review thereto amounted to "nothing less than passing policy judgments upon the acts of
every state legislature in the country." Id. at 185.
153. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173. In Roe, Rehnquist stated that the rational-basis test applies
to all "social and economic legislation," a category he appears to defmie quite broadly. Id.
154. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that Rehnquist "only rarely supported a
claim that the government had violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
expression").
155. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
156. 415 U.S. 566, 591 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 567.
158. Id. at 592.
159. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 570 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority found that the theatre board's denial of use based
solely on its judgment as to the content of the musical was a prior restraint. See id. at 556.
Since the board failed to afford appropriate procedural safeguards to avoid censorship, its
action was held unconstitutional. See id. at 560, 561.
160. See also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 701 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
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compared with Harlan's position in cases like Cohen v. Califomia1" and

Street v. New York, 62 it becomes evident that Harlan saw the general
principles of free speech as a much broader and more powerful limitation
on state authority than does Rehnquist."

Diverging once again from the views of Justice Harlan, Rehnquist
rejects the existence of a constitutional right of privacy. 6 In his dissent

in Roe v. Wade," he articulated his unwillingness "to find within the

scope of the Fourteenth Amendment [such] a right that was apparently
completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment." 6 Here again,
we see Rehnquist constrained by his strict originalism. 167
Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is

generally perceived as a significant limitation on state and local autonomy,
Justice Rehnquist applies it only sparingly.

2. Equal Protection
In Justice Harlan's time, challenges to state laws under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were less frequent than
today."6 ' Since then, however, the Clause has come to serve as a
substantial limitation on state autonomy-a trend that Justice Rehnquist has

consistently opposed. In this area, perhaps more than any other, Rehnquist

remains steadfast to his perceptions of the intent of the framers. In case
after case, he has refused to join the majority of the Court in its
application of the Clause in contexts other than race and its "logical ...
next step," national origin."
dissenting), in which Rehnquist voted to affirm the petitioner's criminal contempt
conviction for describing his alleged attacker as a "chicken-shit" in response to a question
on cross-examination at trial. Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's determination that
"[t]his single, isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer
of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt." Id. at
698, 701.
161. 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
162. 394 U.S. 576 (1969); see also supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
163. But cf PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a
state court's interpretation of its constitution permitting individuals to exercise free speech
and petition rights in a privately owned shopping center).
164. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 203 (discussing Rehnquist's rejection of the right of privacy).
165. 410 U.S. at 171.
166. Id. at 174.
167. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 38.
169. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
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Rehnquist disagrees with the majority of the Court not only as to the

types of cases to which the Equal Protection Clause should apply, but with
respect to the applicable standard of review as well. He has consistently

dissented from the Court's heightened scrutiny of certain equal protection
claims.' Although he seems willing to accept the strict-scrutiny
standard for cases involving racial discrimination, he would prefer to
judge all other types of classifications under the rational-basis test.171 In
the end, Rehnquist's view of the Equal Protection Clause amounts to little
more than a ban on purposeful racial discrimination and other types of

classifications for which no rational justification could possibly exist. 1"

also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (gender);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alienage).
Although Rehnquist bases his argument on the need to enforce only the intent of the
framers, he has weakened this position by extending the Amendment's scope to include
discrimination based on national origin, see Trimble, 430 U.S. at 780, without adequately
explaining why this particular step beyond the original understanding is justifiable, and
others are not. In THrmble he stated that judicial consideration of equal protection claims
not based on race or national origin is "much more difficult," apparently referring to the
decision as to which sorts of classes are to be protected and which are not, an issue
Rehnquist says is "not germane to the meaning of the clause." Id. at 781. But he did
nothing to explain why such a determination is easier with respect to national origin than
it is with alienage, gender or any other immutable birth trait. If he is willing in this context
to take one step beyond original intent, but not another, he ought to explain why.
170. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 407-08 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
171. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 47-48. Although Harlan initially rejected the idea of strict
scrutiny, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 661 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("No such dual-level test has ever been articulated by this Court, and I do not believe that
any such approach is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. .. "),
he probably would have concurred in the use of such a standard, once established, out of
respect for precedent. As a general rule, Harlan felt bound by the principle of stare decisis
to follow precedent with which he disagreed, except when the prior decision involved clear
constitutional error. See Bourguignon, supra note 7, at 279-81; see also Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), discussed supra note 84.
Given his characterization of the "compelling interest" doctrine as "unwise,"
'unfortunate," and "unnecessary," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 .U.S. 618, 659, 661 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), rather than as constitutionally untenable, it seems likely that Harlan
would have considered himself bound to accept such analysis, once fully embraced and
regularly employed by a majority of the Court. He might have continued, however, to
express his distaste for the doctrine in concurrence. See Bourguignon, supra note 7, at 280.
172. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 60 (stating that the presence of purposeful
discrimination is the determining factor with respect to classifications based on race); see
also Trimble, 430 U.S. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that statutes involving
nonracial classifications should be upheld ifjustifiable under any reasonably conceived state
of facts).

NOTE

1991]

As so conceived, Justice Rehnquist's Equal Protection Clause--like his
Due Process Clause-does little to limit state and local autonomy. "In
short, the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the nation-state
relationship is minimal. The 'strong medicine' of the Civil War
amendments is virtually a placebo when administered by Dr.
Rehnquist." 7 '

D. Rehnquist, Reform, and Restraint
Like Harlan, Justice Rehnquist claims to perceive a minimal role for

the federal judiciary. Social change, he says, should come from elected

officials, not the Court.'74 His "commitment to shift power away from

the federal government toward more extensive, independent authority for

the states," 175 however, has led Rehnquist down the primrose path to
judicial activism. 6 In his effort to revive the values of federalism and
rebuild state autonomy, Rehnquist has not felt bound to exercise judicial

restraint."77

The decisions of the Court's 1990-91 Term demonstrate Justice

Rehnquist's willingness to jettison precedent in order to expand state
power. Last Term the Court significantly increased state law enforcement
authority 17 by overturning six of its prior decisions, with Justice

173. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 148.
174. See Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 958-59 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that state legislatures are the proper forum for evaluation of complex
factual issues like capital punishment); Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the Court should not
involve itself in controversial areas of social policy unless absolutely necessary); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (stating that courts
are ill equipped to deal with urgent problems and reform); see also DAVIS, supra note 6,
at 63 (discussing Rehnquist's belief that "policy should be made by elected officials without
interference from the judiciary"). But cf supra note 122.
175. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 149.
176. According to Professor Davis: "The value that Rehnquist assigns to federalism
is so high that it abrogates the prescription for a minimal role for the judiciary .... The
maxim of 'judicial restraint,' in short, applies when property rights or individual rights are
involved but not when state autonomy is at risk." DAVIS, supra note 6, at 36.
177. See Powell, supra note 91, at 1359-60 ("Mo implement 'his federalism' Justice
Rehnquist has been obliged to adopt an extremely aggressive and activist role."); Edwin
M. Yoder, Jr., The Rehnquist Ascendancy: The Radical Agenda of a Triumphant Chief
Justice, WASH. POST, June 30, 1991, at C1 (describing Rehnquist as "an unabashed and
resolute judicial activist" who "uses judicial power zestfully, with minimal camouflage, as
an instrument of his own political agenda").
178. See Ira Mickenberg, Criminal Rulings Granted the State Broad New Power,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S1O (stating that last Term's decisions "g[a]ve the state

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVEW

[VOL. 36

17
Rehnquist either writing for or joining the Court in each instance. 1
Commenting on Rehnquist's activity for the Court last Term, one scholar
stated that although the occasional overturning of precedent is not, in
itself, a bad thing, "[w]hat's disturbing is the hypocrisy with which the
[C]hief [J]ustice has waged a lifelong war against judicial activism and
then does it once he gets five votes."18
A closer examination of some of the Justice's opinions last Term,
however, reveals more than a mere lack of respect for precedent. In
Arizona v. Fulminante,18 ' for example, Rehnquist gathered four other
votes and wrote separately to overturn a long line of decisions and to
extend the harmless error rule to the use of coerced confessions. 2 Yet
there was no need for the Court even to reach this issue, since a majority
of the Justices had determined that the use of the coerced statement in this
1
case was not harmless and thus reversed Fulminante's conviction. u
Justice Rehnquist, however, apparently felt unconstrained by the longstanding juridical principle that a court-particularly the Supreme
Court-should not render decisions on constitutional questions unless
necessary to resolve the immediate dispute before the court."'

broad new power to search, seize and interrogate its citizens" ); see also Marcia Coyle,
Complete Control, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S1, S2 (suggesting that the Court appears
to be returning to the state sovereign functions doctrine of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
179. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991) (overruling Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277 (1983)); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989));
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991) (overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963)); California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (overruling
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)); see also Mary Coombs, Right Makes Might:
Laying Down the Law at the Supreme Court, CONN. L. TRIB., July 29, 1991, at A7
(discussing the overturning of precedent in these cases); Coyle, supra note 178 (same).
180. Coyle, supra note 178, at S2 (quoting Professor Burt Neubome).
181. 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991).
182. See id. at 1261 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority as to Part II of the
opinion, and dissenting as to Parts I and III).
183. See id. at 1253; see also Mickenberg, supra note 178, at SlI ("Mhe harmless
error-holding was completely irrelevant to the determination of this particular case.").
184. See, e.g., Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144, 151 (1971) (quoting United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 5 (1947)) ("'We have consistently refrained from passing on the
constitutionality of a statute until a case involving it has reached a stage where the decision
of a precise constitutional issue is necessary.'"); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581,
604 (1971) (stating that "we resist the pulls to decide the constitutional issues in this case
on a broader basis than the record before us imperatively requires" in accordance with the
"general rule that this Court should not treat broad constitutional questions when narrow
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Consider also Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Payne v.

Tennessee,"a in which he overruled two recent cases to hold that states
may admit, in capital sentencing trials, evidence and arguments concerning

the victim's character and the impact of the crime on the victim's
family."a

The question of victim impact evidence, however, was not

presented by the parties in either the petition for certiorari or the response;
rather, shortly after certiorari in another case chosen to test this issue was

dismissed as improvidently granted, 1" the Court quickly granted cert in
Payne and instructed the parties "to brief and argue whether Booth v.
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers should be overruled.""' As
Justice Marshall pointed out in a powerful dissent, which was to be his

last for the Court, "[n]either the law nor the facts supporting [these two
cases] underwent any change in the last four years. Only the personnel of
this Court did." 18 9 One commentator has suggested that the "unusual
procedural steps" taken to bring the issue before the Court were employed

"to make sure that the decisions [in Booth and Gathers were] reversed by

the end of the term."" 9

More unsettling is Rehnquist's general discussion of stare decisis in
this case. He down-played the significance of the doctrine in all but
property and contract cases, and suggested that 5-4 decisions in which a

ones will suffice to dispose of the litigation").
185. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
186. See id. at 2609.
187. See Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991). The Court determined during oral
argument that the case rested on an adequate and independent state ground. See Tony
Mauro, Justices Shift Cases, Set Stage for Reversal, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at 14;
see also Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus Cases Rewrote the Doctrine, iAT'L L.J., Aug.
19, 1991, at S6 (discussing Payne and other habeas decisions last Term).
188. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 1407, 1407 (1991) (grant of certiorari) (citations
omitted).
189. Payne, II S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall went on
to state that
[t]here is nothing new in the majority's discussion of the supposed deficiencies
of Booth and Gathers. Every one of the arguments made by the majority can be
found in the dissenting opinions filed in those two cases, and... each argument
was convincingly answered by Justice Powell and Justice Brennan.
...Justice Powell and Justice Brennan's position carried the day in those
cases and became the law of the land. The real question, then, is whether today's
majority has come forward with the type of extraordinary showing that this
Court has historically demanded before overruling one of its precedents. In my
view, the majority clearly has not made any such showing. Indeed, the striking
feature of the majority's opinion is its radical assertion that it need not even try.
Id. at 2621.
190. Mauro, supra note 187, at 14.
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majority prevails over "spirited dissents" should be more readily
overruled.19' As Justice Marshall said: "By limiting full protection of the

doctrine 6f stare decisis to 'cases involving property and contract rights'

the majority sends a clear signal that essentially all decisions implementing
the personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment are open to reexamination.""

A final example involves Justice Rehnquist's efforts surrounding
another case decided last Term, McCleskey v. Zant.'" In McCleskey,
Rehnquist joined the majority of the Court in adopting the restrictive
"cause and prejudice" standard for judging whether a federal habeas

corpus petition represents an "abuse of the writ,"1

thus limiting the

availability and likely success of second and subsequent habeas petitions.
Well before the Court rendered this decision, however, Rehnquist had

begun campaigning for its result. In 1988, he organized a committee of
five southern judges, headed by Justice Powell, to conduct a study for
Congress to determine how the number of death penalty appeals could be

cut back. 95 The committee recommended prohibiting a second habeas
challenge in capital cases, and Rehnquist forwarded its report to
Congress." 9 Much of the plan, however, was rejected by the United
States Judicial Counsel, and Congress, "despite intense lobbying," opted

not to include any of the committee's recommendations in its 1990 crime

bill."9 But, "[h]aving failed to obtain from Congress the legislation the
[Chief [J]ustice sought, the 'conservative' majority adopted the rule
rejected by Congress" in McCleskey."9 ' Thus, rather than viewing the

Court as a check on congressional excess, Rehnquist seems at times to

191. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-11. In his discussion of stare decisis in Payne,
Rehnquist cited to all of the decisions over the past 20 years in which the Court, either
fully or partially, overruled its prior constitutional decisions. See id. at 2610 n. 1. What he
did not say, however, was that he either wrote for or joined the majority in 23 of the 31
decisions in this list in which he took part.
192. Id. at 2623 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2610); see also Linda
Greenhouse, The Nation: Conservatively Speaking, It's an Activist Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 4, at 1 (stating that "there is a distinct sense at the Court now of
completing long-held agendas").
193. 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).
194. Id. at 1470.
195. See Stephen Reinhardt, 'Conservative' Rehnquist Court Unmasks Its Naked
Activism, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at B7.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also Greenhouse, supra note 192, at 1 (stating that McCleskey
"accomplished much of what Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist tried to do last year in
a personal campaign to persuade Congress to amend the habeas corpus statute").
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view it as a replacement for the legislative process. "This is not judicial
restraint; it is judicial license."199
Thus, although Justice Rehnquist advocates judicial restraint when
reviewing state and local policies, he is a skilled practitioner of judicial
activism when it comes to rebuilding and expanding state and local power
or limiting the scope of federal authority.' Although it may appear at

first blush that Harlan would support such efforts to realign the "balance"
upset by the Warren Court, he held too much respect for precedent and
the judicial process to applaud such endeavors." °1 This is precisely the
sort of result-oriented decision making that Justice Harlan so

deplored.'

IV.

CONCLUSION

Any word, much less one so loosely defined as "federalism," can

admit of many meanings.

For Justice Harlan, the term connoted a

harmonious state of intergovernmental relations, where power was

delicately balanced between and within the two levels of government. Only
through respect for the proper roles of all of the coordinate units of
199. Yoder, supra note 177, at Cl.
200. Another example of Justice Rehnquist's doctrinal inconsistency regarding judicial
restraint is found in the are of affirmative action. For an analysis of the current
conservative Court's disparate treatment of discriminatory impact on "innocent white
victims" (which the Court views as constitutionally significant) and on "innocent black
victims" (which it says carries no constitutional significance), see David Chang,
DiscriminatoryImpact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or
Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991). Professor Chang states that selfproclaimed judicial conservatives like "Rehnquist are willing to thwart local legislative
choices, based on their own subjective, standardless notions of 'fairness,' when reviewing
the harmful impact of affirmative action programs on 'innocent white victims.'" Id. at 843
n. 179.
201. See, e.g., Bourguignon, supra note 7, at 277-81; Dane, supra note 38, at 554,
558 n.41, 562-68.
202. See supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 92,
at 328 (asserting that "in too many instances Justice Rehnquist's efforts have been impeded
by his ideological commitment to a particular result").
203. See generally JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, CONCORD AND LIBERTY 12 (Helene Weyl
trans., 1946):
Nobody will make bold to maintain that the meaning of a word can be gathered
from dictionaries. A dictionary furnishes, at best, a general scheme in which the
manifold actual significations a word admits may be inserted. But the real
meaning of a word appears when the word is uttered and functions in the human
activity called speech. Hence we must know ,who says it to whom, when and
where.
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government could our federal system thrive and endure, and could the
liberties of its citizens be truly protected. To borrow the words of James
Madison, Harlan saw "the separate and distinct exercise of the different
powers of government . . . to be essential " ' to the preservation of
freedom and liberty in this country.
Justice Harlan's federalism placed significant constraints upon all
actors within the federal system, and was applied in an even-handed and
consistent manner. Harlan's greatest virtue, however, was his constant,
careful, and thorough efforts to explain his approach and its necessity. He
went to great lengths to help us understand his steadfast devotion to
federalism, consistently articulating why its values must be respected and
the likely consequences of a failure to pay them due heed.
For Justice Rehnquist, the word federalism conjures up images of a
world in which community governance is supreme, free of federal-or
even state-interference. He construes federal limitations on state
autonomy extremely narrowly and, although he generally advocates
judicial restraint when reviewing state and local policies, he is willing to
take an activist approach to return governance to what he views as its
appropriate location, the community.
Yet the principal defect of Justice Rehnquist's federalism is not the
one-sidedness of his approach, or even his inconsistency regarding judicial
restraint. Although these elements are problematic, the central deficiency
of Rehnquist's federalism is his failure to adequately justify and explain
its application-his rejection of the need to persuade and his refusal to
address his own doctrinal inconsistencies. Justice Harlan illustrated;
Justice Rehnquist declares. It is this difference that has caused so many
critics to characterize Rehnquist as an "ideologue,"'
while others
continue to refer to Harlan as a "judge's judge."' In the end, it may
be that Harlan's views are more convincing simply because he attempted
to convince.
Lori G. Wentworth

204. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
205. See, e.g., George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297, 1299 n.7 (1990); Powell, supra note 91, at 1362; David A. Kaplan &
John Riley, Sure He's Smart, but Is He Rightfor the Court?, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1987,

at 31; David G. Savage, The Rehnquist Court: Bill Rehnquist Was Once an Extremist. Now
His Views Almost Always Become the Law of the Land, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991,
Magazine, at 12.
206. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L.
REV. 409, 411 (1987) (quoting Paul A. Fruend, Foreword to THE EVOLUTION OF A
JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN
xiii, xiii (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969); The Fleshing Out ofDavid Souter, CHICAGO TRIB.,

Sept. 12, 1990, at C18.

